chronologically and geographically diverse twentieth century conflicts. Of course, such a thematic group of articles can never hope to conclusively address the functional or moral value of the laws of war: however, by focusing on one issue -prisoner treatment -across a series of case studies, ranging from the Japanese occupation in the Second World War to the Korean War and the decolonisation conflict in Aden -it becomes possible to glean a clearer understanding of how the international legal framework can have a cultural influence upon conflict mentalities. This introduction will first outline how the laws of war relating to prisoners of war developed and evolved as a result of specific historical contexts and why they came to hold such prominence and, second, will consider to what degree the articles in this special edition shed light on broad structural thematic developments regarding their cultural status and application.
As one of the earliest aspects of warfare to be legally codified in international law, during the period of its initial development in the late nineteenth century, the treatment of prisoners of war in many ways offers a litmus test of the influence and reach of legal cultural norms in conflict situations. The 1864 and 1906 Geneva Conventions offered significant new protection for enemy troops found wounded on the battlefield; the 1899 and 1907 Hague Conventions on Land Warfare set out a series of articles on how prisoners of war should be managed, in particular the stipulation which appears in article 4 of both Conventions that prisoners of war should be treated 'humanely.' 4 These
Conventions were intended to build on the groundwork of existing customary laws of war which had already established some basic shared European norms for capture and prisoner regimes, and also to work closely with national military law -the text of the Conventions was meant to be integrated by signatory states into their military law.
However, the Hague Conventions in particular presented only largely broad brush stroke guidance to captivity treatment which was soon superseded by the challenges of the totalising mentalities of the 1914-1918 conflict. By 1916, the major belligerent states -Germany, France, Great Britain, Austria-Hungary and Russia -were all using prisoner of war labour on the battlefield, in many cases under shellfire, placing prisoners' health and safety at risk to a degree that significantly breached the spiritand often the letter -of the contemporary Hague corpus of the laws of war.
5
The initial pre-1914 codification of the laws of war, however, focused almost entirely upon one category -the combatant prisoner of war -with some additional protections offered for padres, medical staff and journalists taken prisoner on the field of battle: France and Germany, 1914 -1920 (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011 Categorisation mattered because, as the nature of who was being taken prisoner in war diversified and expanded across the twentieth century, the applicability of the laws of war stipulations to protect prisoners was thrown into question. The decolonisation wars that followed the end of the Second World War further highlighted the problems of application of the laws of war as they existed at that time: it was relatively easy for states engaged in asymmetrical warfare against their own colonial subjects to claim that international humanitarian law did not apply, often either because the term 'war' was deemed inadmissible to conflicts occurring within the borders of empires rather than between states, to domestic unrest or to civil war situations, or because those taken prisoner did not fall into the category of the traditional soldier combatant -the guerrilla or partisan remained outside the protection of the laws of war as they stood by the This debate as to the efficacy of laws of war is not new. In the interwar period, James
Garner, a leading academic expert on international law, declared in a lecture that although the laws of war had been breached in the First World War that was not the essential point regarding their value. The purpose of law was to set out norms and demarcate boundaries. What was at stake, in other words, in laws of war was not that they were never broken -what law is never breached? Rather it was that they created a mentality that limitations on wartime behaviour existed and offered a means of gauging how far outside of acceptable practice a state had gone: Garner asked rhetorically 'what character the world war would have had had there been no binding norms upon any of the belligerents.' 7 It is this functional interpretation of international law -its value in setting boundaries and a framework of standards -that proved its main First World War usefulness. It is a very different understanding to that of Luttwak, quoted at the opening of this introduction, where efficacy lies in the degree to which the law is never broken.
As the twentieth century progressed, to this cultural function of international law was added another: the threat, and later effective implementation, of sanctions against states which broke those international laws of war to which they had previously signed up;
this was intended to give international humanitarian law a strong deterrent function. This case also flags another structural weakness of the laws of war, as they existed at the time, which was the civil war scenario. While the Korean War was internationalised due to the involvement of multiple nation states, it also encompassed a civil war.
Throughout the twentieth century the internationally agreed laws of war remained applicable to interstate conflict only; they were subordinate to the overriding powers of constantly evolving. 13 They show that international humanitarian law also needs neutral watchdogs to ensure its implementation: the role of the International Red Cross, protecting powers and neutral observers all mattered in the conflicts examined here, often thanks to their ability to publicise and shame states for not enforcing international law. The power of social stigma in an increasingly interlinked and media savvy world has some weight in encouraging nation states to abide by norms. For Japan, the United
States and North and South Korea, and Britain dealing with the Aden insurgency, their state's international reputation mattered; as a result of the laws of war framework from earlier in the twentieth century and the cultural prestige that it had successfully attached to treating captives well as a demarcation of 'civilisation,' prisoner treatment was a priority -or at least being seen to uphold good captive treatment publicly was. This should not be viewed as a historical inevitability: the shock felt at the images from Abu
Ghraib, that the United States, which had built its national identity on the concept of abiding by the rule of law, could mistreat prisoners, cannot be taken for granted in a world where Islamic State has abandoned not only international legal prisoner treatment norms, both based on Conventions and custom, but also many of those of Islamic law tradition. Here one finds a final essential theme of all three articles: international laws of war regarding prisoners interact and shape grassroots attitudes and work best where they 
